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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A SOURCE OF STATE
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS*
INTRODUCTION
When Justice Holmes remarked that "[a] river is more than an
amenity, it is a treasure,"' he captured the essence of society's relation-
ship with water. Although water is especially important in the arid and
semiarid lands of the West, 2 water has a special importance wherever it
may be found. Whether found in the Great Ponds of Massachusetts or
the prairie potholes of the northern Great Plains, along the lakefront of
Chicago or amidst the tufa towers of Mono Lake, water is as vital as the
air we breathe, as influential in the development of our national charac-
ter as the land, and as evanescent asferae naturae.3 Having such singular
and valuable characteristics, water has always been coveted by mankind
and much sought after by men who wished to "own" it, especially when
* This note is exclusively concerned with the application of the public trust
doctrine to inland waters in states lying on or west of the hundredth meridian. In large
measure, the central theme of this note was inspired by Professor Harrison Dunning's
thought-provoking article on the public trust doctrine and the central case in the Mono
Lake litigation, National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d
419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Mono Lake], in which he noted that the "[ulse of the public trust doctrine to limit water
rights in a situation such as that at Mono Lake is strikingly similar to use of the Winters
Doctrine to limit state-recognized water rights." Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1, 17-44 (1984).
The author would like to thank Barrett W. McInerney, counsel for California Trout, for his
invaluable assistance and Professors John A. Carver, Jr. and Edward J. Roche, Jr. of the
University of Denver College of Law for their unrelenting critiques of the ideas advanced
in this note. My thanks also to Professor John Rohr of the Center for Public
Administration and Policy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University for
pointing out the objection discussed in and disposed of in footnote 80. Otherwise, the
thoughts expressed herein as well as any errors, omissions, and inconsistencies are, of
course, solely the responsibility of the author.
During the final stages of preparing this note, the author learned through Professor
Dunning that the Superior Court of Mono County had issued a preliminary injunction in
response to a request by the California-based fishermen's organization (California Trout)
to maintain a minimum instream flow of nineteen cubic feet per second (cfs) in Rush
Creek, a non-navigable tributary of Mono Lake. Telephone conversation with Professor
Harrison Dunning (April 23, 1986). The preliminary injunction, effective since March 7,
1985, operates against the Grant Lake Dam, which is operated by the Department of Water
and Power of the City of Los Angeles. Telephone conversation with Barrett W.
McInerney, counsel for California Trout (May 5, 1986). This judicial order represents, to
the best of my knowledge, the first instance of a judicially-created quantified public trust
water right in a non-navigable stream.
1. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
2. "There is no more essential commodity in the western United States than water."
WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, NEW CHALLENGE, NEW DIRECTION: THE WATER POL-
icy REPORT OF THE WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION 5 (on file with the author). One
state supreme court has noted, with reference to the waters of its state, that they "are the
very life blood of its existence." Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 702, 22 P.2d
5, 16 (1933).
3. See IAJ. GRIMES, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 318 (repl. ed. 1980); see also 1 S.
WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 3 (3d ed. 1911).
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it occurs in those areas that are "water-poor." "Ownership" of water
has been a problematic concept for human societies precisely because of
its unique characteristics. 4 Societal concerns about the ownership of
water are manifestations of society's concerns over the right to use water
resources, for ownership in its fullest sense obviously includes the right
to control the use of that which is owned.5 Throughout the history of
Western civilization, the water law of every society has reflected the bal-
ance struck between proponents of public interests and rights in water
and proponents of private interests and rights in water.
6
This note will review the role that the public trust doctrine has had
in the balances struck and restruck by societies between private owner-
ship interests in water resources and public ownership interests in water
resources. Following a brief historical review,7 it will be suggested that
the public trust doctrine can serve as the basis for a new species of water
rights-state reserved rights, which would for the most part be analo-
gous to federal reserved rights8 in their scope and effect. This proposi-
tion will be buttressed by discussions about the doctrine of pre-existing
title and state constitutional and statutory provisions on state or public
ownership of state water resources. Finally, this note will argue that just
compensation is not a constitutionally-required prerequisite to the in-
fringement of existing water rights, except in those instances where the
4. "The water of a stream, lake, or pond cannot be dealt with as real property on
account of its mobile and evanescent nature .... " 1AJ. GRIMES, supra note 3, at 320.
5. See I J. GRIMES, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 3 (repl. ed. 1980).
6. See MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Devel-
opment, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 511,
515-87 (1975); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine,
79 YALE L.J. 762, 772-73 (1970).
7. Because of its ancient origins, obscure development, and tremendous potential
impact of private ownership interests in water, the public trust doctrine has been the sub-
ject of over 100 scholarly commentaries with the vast majority having appeared in the past
decade. See Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Ques-
tioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 643-44 n.75 (1986) (extensive, albeit
partial, listing of the voluminous materials on this subject).
8. The United States Supreme Court has concisely described the basis and scope of
the doctrine as follows:
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land
from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by
implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent
needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In doing so the United
States requires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date
of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. . . . The
doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing
water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams.
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (citations omitted).
To date, the question of whether the public trust doctrine applies to the United States
has yet to be directly addressed by either the Supreme Court or the federal courts of
appeals. District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
However, at least two federal district courts have explicitly held that the doctrine applies to
the federal government. In In re Stuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va.
1980), the court held that "[u]nder the public trust doctrine, . . . the United States [has]
the right and duty to protect and preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife re-
sources." Id. at 40. In the other federal case, Congress was held to be the trustee of
public trust values "'in the tideland and the land below the low water mark that relate to
the commerce and other powers delegated to the federal government." United States v.
1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Mass. 1981).
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right affected was perfected prior to statehood, and that the correction
of any inequity resulting from the absence ofjust compensation is a mat-
ter most properly addressed by state legislatures. It is the hope of the
author that this note will contribute some new ideas about how the pub-
lic trust doctrine can be used to advance the state management of inland
water resources in the West and how the consequences of the "colli-
sion" 9 between the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water
rights systems can best be managed.' 0
I. THE ORIGINS & EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. Civil & Common Law Origins
As a legal concept, the public trust doctrine can be traced to both
Roman law and English common law. In Roman times, any person was
free to use rivers, ports, and the seashore to the high tide level as long as
such use did not interfere with other uses. This concept was first articu-
lated in Justinian's maxim that "[b]y the law of nature ... the air, run-
ning water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea" are common
to man.II This principle eventually found its way into French law and
has also been cited as a source of Louisiana civil law on property.1 2 Sim-
ilar concepts were carried over into Spanish law, Mexican law, and ulti-
mately California law. For instance, in a recent public trust case, the
California Supreme Court cited a thirteenth century Spanish law, Las
9. See infra note 92.
10. The author is not unaware of the chilly reception that the public trust doctrine has
received in some states, most notably in Colorado. In People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137,
141, 597 P. 2d 1025, 1027 (1979), that state's supreme court in an opinion, which has been
criticized as poorly reasoned, Comment, People v. Emmert: A Step Backward for Recreational
Water Use in Colorado, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 252-53, 270 (1981), and which provoked
two sharp dissents, refused to recognize the public trust doctrine as a basis for permitting
public recreational use of surface waters flowing over privately owned streambeds.
Furthermore, at a recent seminar on water law, one prominent member of Colorado's
water law bar was heard to say that "[w]e don't need a broad public trust doctrine in
Colorado." G. Hobbs, Presentation at a water law seminar, entitled "How the Rivers Run
... (Denver, Colorado April 19, 1986). Hobbs argued that the Colorado Water Con-
servation Board's power to appropriate water for public trust purposes, such as fish and
wildlife enhancement and recreation, under existing state water law negated the need for
the exercise of the public trust doctrine in Colorado. Hobbs, however, failed to mention
that "public" water rights acquired by the Colorado Water Conservation Board are usually
so junior in their priority that they would not satisfy the public uses for which they were
appropriated during water-short years and are not adequately enforced. See Wilkinson,
Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317, 334 n.73 (1985). Wilkinson also
notes that Colorado "has never made a call to protect its instream appropriations." Id.
(reporting information obtained from an interview with StevenJ. Shupe, Assistant Attor-
ney General, State of Colorado, on December 5, 1984).
1I. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environ-
mental Right, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 195, 196-97 (1980) (quoting from THE INSTITuTES oFJUS-
TINIAN 2.1.1 (T. Cooper trans. & ed. 1841)).
12. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So.2d 576, 581-82 n.2 (La. 1975), the
Louisiana Supreme Court cited several articles of the state civil code providing that such
things as air, running water, and the sea and its shores are not susceptible to ownership,
but are held in common for the use and benefit of all. These articles, according to the
court, arise from various sources, including Justinian's Institutes, Article 538 of the Code
Napoleon, and Toullier, Le droit civil francais, Tome Troisieme, Liv. II, tit. I, chap. III,
n.38-39 at 27 (1839).
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Siete Partidas, that had applied to California while it was a part of Mex-
ico and thereafter under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 13 Las Siete
Partidas states that the sea, seashores, rivers, harbors, and public high-
ways "belong to all persons in common."'
14
While the civil law public trust doctrine is based upon the concept
that ownership of such public areas is not possible, the common law
public trust doctrine is predicated upon sovereign ownership of such
shores and waterways.1 5 The Crown was considered to own these areas;
however, because the public enjoyed the right to use them, the Crown's
ownership could not be transferred or separated from the sovereign.16
This common law doctrine was expressly adopted in the United States at
the time of independence on the theory that the rights held by the
Crown accrued to the states, including sovereign ownership in trust of
such public areas. 17 Although the precedential weight of these civil and
common law rationales for the application of a public trust doctrine in
the United States has been seriously questioned,' 8 the doctrine's legal
history is largely irrelevant in light of the American courts' acceptance of
the principle that rights to use shores and streams should be held in
trust for the benefit of the public.' 9
13. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 298 n.8, 644
P.2d 792, 797 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 604 n.8 (1982) (quoting Law III of Title XXVIII of
Las Siete Partidas, CCH (Spain) (1931) pp. 820-21), rev'd sub nom. Summa Corp. v. Califor-
nia ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984). In Summa, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the California Supreme Court's approval of California's assertion of public
trust rights in privately-held tidelands, which had originally been acquired under Mexican
grants and validated following California statehood by federal patents. It should be noted
that California did not acquire any ownership interests in Mexican and Spanish grant lands
upon its admission to the Union. The Court's reversal was based upon the distinction
between title acquired from the state and the species of title involved in the case, which
was predicated upon federal legislation and federal patent. According to the Court, Cali-
fornia should have participated in the patent proceedings, which confirmed the Mexican
grant, if it desired to subject the grant lands to the public trust doctrine. 466 U.S. at 209.
The Supreme Court, however, did not reach the issue as to whether Mexican law gave
California a public trust easement over such lands. 466 U.S. at 201-02 n.l.
14. Venice Peninsula, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 298 n.8, 644 P.2d 792, 797 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr.
599, 604 n.8. See also Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891) (Hispanic
rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo serve as an independent basis for
guaranteeing public rights to navigable waters); San Francisco v. LeRoy, 138 U.S. 656
(1891) (the United States acquired the duty to protect the tideland trust when it acquired
California from Mexico); Comment, California Beach Access: The Mexican Law and the Public
Trust, 2 EcOLOGY L.Q. 571 (1972).
15. See Stevens, supra note 11, at 197-98.
16. Id. (quoting 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S.
Thorne trans. 1968)).
17. See infra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
18. One commentator has asserted that both Justinian's declaration and Bracton's
writings were more likely their own "idealization[s]" in that they did not accurately reflect
the Roman and English practice. Professor Lazarus has argued that the Romans "did not
shy away from conveying private rights in coastal resources" and that English assertions of
public rights held by the Crown were merely means to increase the treasury. Lazarus,
supra note 7, at 634-35 & nn.12, 19. See also Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public
Trust: An HistoricalAnalysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976); MacGrady, supra note 6, at 599.
19. "[W]hat is important is what was perceived to be the common law and what Ameri-
can courts chose to accept of it." Stevens, supra note 11, at 198; "The correct views on
Roman and English law are of no more than historical interest today." Dunning, The Sig-
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B. American Developments
Arnold v. Mundy, 20 in 1821, was the first American case to embrace
the public trust doctrine.2 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a conveyance of land that included oyster beds be-
low the high water mark could operate to exclude the public. The court
held that states, as successors to the interests that the Crown possessed,
held rights to the beds of navigable waters in trust for their citizens.
22
Any grant purporting to divest the citizens of these rights was deemed
void. 23 The "navigable waters" requirement arose from the Roman and
common law test for distinguishing private from public waters. 2 4 As the
use of the public trust doctrine increased in the United States, the navi-
gable waters requirement acquired meanings that varied with its applica-
tion. For example, the requirement differs when determining federal
commerce clause jurisdiction as opposed to determining title to sub-
merged lands.2 5 Today, the navigable waters requirement, as a limita-
tion upon the scope of the public trust doctrine, is becoming less
important.
2 6
Subsequent to Arnold v. Mundy, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the public trust doctrine on several occasions during the
nineteenth century. In Martin v. Waddell,2 7 the Court held that Wad-
dell's title to submerged lands in Raritan Bay, below the high water
mark, did not give him the exclusive right to take oysters from the bay.
The Court reasoned that if the surrender of lands from the Crown to the
Duke of York, the source of Waddell's title, had been intended to sever
from the sovereign the "right of dominion and ownership in the rivers,
bays, and arms of the sea, and the soils under them," such a conveyance
would have to be express and could not be implied. 2 8 The Court fur-
ther held that upon the inception of state government in New Jersey,
nificance of California's Public Trust Easement For California Water Rights Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REV.
357, 363 (1980).
20. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
21. Several colonies had previously, through ordinances, protected public access to
ponds and lakes for the purpose of fishing and hunting. See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S.
371, 393 (1891); see also Smith, The Great Pond Ordinance-Collectivism in Northern New Eng-
land, 30 B.U.L. REV. 178 (1950).
22. 6 N.J.L. at 78.
23. Id.
24. See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 513-15 (quoting Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139,
1143 (Minn. 1893)).
25. See Stevens, supra note 11, at 202-09; see, e.g., State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, 503
P.2d 1231 (1972) (navigability used to determine title).
26. This is a result of the different nature of the public trust protection. For instance,
the navigability test serves the purpose of determining whether title to land under water or
tideland should be privately owned or owned by the state. This requirement becomes
ineffectual in determining the right to use the water in the stream, whether for public
recreation, irrigation, or environmental habitat maintenance. See Montana Coalition for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984); Montana Coalition for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
27. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
28. Id. at 416. Included in the sphere of such rights was "the right of common fishery
for the common people." Id.
1986]
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these "prerogatives" of the Crown became vested in the state. 29
In 1892, the Supreme Court decided a case that has been described
as the American "lodestar" of the public trust doctrine: 30 Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois.3 1 The case involved a grant of a 1,000 acre tract of
tidal and submerged land on Chicago's waterfront to the railroad by the
Illinois legislature. The legislature later rescinded the grant, which
prompted a suit to determine the rights of the railroad company, the city
and the state.3 2 The Court upheld the legislative revocation, holding
that the conveyance would have been essentially an "abdication" of state
control over lands under navigable waters, inconsistent with the "trust
which requires the government of the state to preserve such water for
the use of the public." 3 3 The Court further held that such a trust cannot
be affected by a transfer or conveyance and, therefore, the control of the
state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost.
3 4
Since Illinois Central, cases in numerous jurisdictions have relied
upon the public trust doctrine in addressing public interests in waters
and water-related lands. 3 5 Nowhere has the reliance upon and expan-
sion of the doctrine been so extensive as in California.
Beginning with People v. California Fish Co. 36 in 1913, the California
Supreme Court has held that certain tidelands, sold to private parties
pursuant to various statutes, were subject to the public right of naviga-
tion and that the state reserved the right to make navigational improve-
ments where necessary. 3 7 The court further held that, regardless of the
effect of a conveyance upon title, a transferee cannot "destroy, obstruct,
or injuriously affect the public right of navigation in the waters
thereof.''38 In City of Long Beach v. Mansell,30 the court reaffirmed its
holding in California Fish, noting that only "bare legal title" was con-
veyed when private ownership in tidal lands was created. 40 However,
the court did note that where the legislature determined that such lands
were no longer useful for the trust purposes, they could be conveyed
29. 41 U.S. at 416. See also Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (newly
admitted states had no less power to exert such a trust than the original states).
30. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MiCH. L. REV. 471, 489 (1970).
31. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
32. Id. at 389-90.
33. Id. at 452-53.
34. Id. See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
35. See infra note 74.
36. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
37. 166 Cal. at 596, 138 P. at 87. Distinctions have been made in California between
legislation that authorizes the conveyance of tideland for the purpose of furthering naviga-
tion or commerce ("special acts") and "general acts" that authorize conveyance of tide-
land not expressly for the purpose of navigation or commerce. The special acts have been
deemed to convey absolute title, while the general acts convey title subject to the public
trust. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d
362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
38. 166 Cal. at 587-88, 138 P. at 84.
39. 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).
40. 3 Cal. 3d at 482, 476 P.2d at 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
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into fee simple absolute private ownership. 4 1
The scope of the public trust doctrine in California underwent a
major expansion in Marks v. Whitney, 42 where the court extended the
doctrine's protections to environmental and recreational values. The
original defendant, Marks, had sought to fill and develop his tideland
property. Claiming that such action would cut off his littoral ownership,
Whitney had sought a declaration that Marks' property was subject to
both a public trust easement and certain private easements held by
Whitney. 43 In agreeing with Whitney, the court explained that the pub-
lic trust right of navigation possessed by the public included the right to
fish, hunt, bathe, swim, and boat. 4 4 Quoting California Fish, the court
stated that the private right of a tideland owner extended only as far "as
the public interests will permit."'45 On this basis and on the finding of a
state interest in maintaining the tideland for the public, the court pre-
vented Marks from filling and developing his tidal property.
4 6
C. The Mono Lake Decision and its Legal Progeny
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,4 7 the seminal application of
the public trust doctrine in the area of water rights, represents the cur-
rent high water mark of the California experience with the public trust
doctrine. The case involved a direct conflict between use of water for
maintaining wildlife habitat and appropriations for the City of Los Ange-
les. In 1940, Los Angeles acquired the right to appropriate waters from
streams tributary to Mono Lake.4 8 The heaviest diversions occurred be-
tween 1970 and 1980 and resulted in a thirty percent reduction in the
lake's surface area and a forty foot decrease in water level. The reduc-
tion in the lake's water level had a debilitating effect on its wildlife popu-
lations. For instance, a large number of California gulls lost safe habitat
when an island became connected to the main shore, allowing coyotes to
reach the island. The lake's brine shrimp population, a major source of
food for waterfowl at the lake, was also threatened by the increased sa-
41. Id.
42. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
43. 6 Cal. 3d at 256, 491 P.2d at 377, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
44. 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796. As was later noted by the
California Supreme Court, the traditional trust purposes of navigation, commerce and
fisheries did not limit the public trust doctrine. ,Vono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 435, 658 P.2d at
719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
45. 6 Cal. 3d at 260, 491 P.2d at 379, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
46. The court noted in passing that one of the most important public uses of the
tidelands trust
is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the
scenery and climate of the area. It is not necessary to here define precisely all the
public uses which encumber tidelands.
6 Cal. 3d at 260-61, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
47. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cerl. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
48. The rights were acquired through California Water Resources Control Board per-
mits. 33 Cal. 3d at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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linity of the lake water due to Los Angeles' depletions. 49
In 1979, several plaintiffs, including the National Audubon Society,
brought suit to enjoin Los Angeles from further diversions from the
lake's tributaries, asserting that the public trust doctrine protected the
lake. 50 In its decision, the California Supreme Court reviewed both the
California public trust doctrine and the California system of water
rights. The court stated that "[t]he objective of the public trust has
evolved in tandem with the changing public perception of the values and
uses of waterways." 5 1 Against this background the court noted that,
although Mono Lake was a navigable waterway, the issue was a new one:
the extent to which the public trust doctrine applies to nonnavigable
tributaries to navigable waterways. After reviewing several California
cases on the issue of navigability, the court concluded that the doctrine
would protect navigable waters from "harm caused by diversion of non-
navigable tributaries."
'52
After discussing the evolution of the public trust doctrine, the court
stated that the cases demonstrate the power of the state, as trustee, to
revoke rights granted by the state or to apply the trust to lands that had
previously been considered free of the trust.53 The court then noted
that the California dual water rights system, encompassing both appro-
priative and riparian rights, had existed independent of the public trust
doctrine.5 4 After rejecting both the Audubon Society's argument that
the public trust doctrine is antecedent to, and thus limits, all appropria-
tive rights, and Los Angeles' argument that the doctrine has been" 'sub-
sumed' into the appropriative" system, the court came to three
conclusions. 55 First, the principle that the state as sovereign retains su-
pervisory control over waters, tidelands, and shores prevents any party
from "acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful
to the interests protected by the public trust."'56 Second, the court
stated that the legislature, in some "necessary" situations, has the power
to allow diversions that may "unavoidably harm" trust uses at the source
of the stream. 57 Finally, the court held that "[t]he state has an affirma-
tive duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and alloca-
tion of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever
49. 33 Cal. 3d at 430-31, 658 P.2d at 715-16, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
50. The case was transferred to a federal district court, which requested that the state
courts rule on the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the appropriative
water rights system and the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Superior
Court of Alpine County held that the public trust doctrine did not constitute a basis for
challenging the diversions and entered summary judgment for the defendant, the Depart-
ment of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles. 33 Cal. 3d at 431-33, 658 P. 2d at
716-18, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
51. 33 Cal. 3d at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
52. 33 Cal. 3d at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
53. 33 Cal. 3d at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
54. The court also noted, however, that by statute, beneficial use in California in-
cludes the use of water for recreation and preservation and enhancement of fish and wild-
life resources. 33 Cal. 3d at 444, 658 P.2d at 726, 189 Cal Rptr. at 363.
55. 33 Cal. 3d at 445-46, 658 P.2d at 727-28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
56. 33 Cal. 3d at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
57. 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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feasible." '5 8 This final conclusion was based on the possibility that, in
the absence of the consideration of public trust values, an appropriative
system could result in unjustified harm to public trust interests. 59 Be-
cause neither the legislature, the Water Resources Control Board, nor
the lower courts had determined the "impact of diversion on the Mono
Lake environment" by balancing the water needs of Los Angeles against
the public interest in Mono Lake, the case was reversed and
remanded.
60
The Mono Lake decision has elicited a significant amount of legal
commentary about its potential impact upon the public trust doctrine. 6 '
The California cases, however, are not the only important public trust
decisions in recent years. Several other jurisdictions have applied the
public trust doctrine, some relying not only upon the common law the-
ory of the public trust, but also upon statutory and constitutional provi-
sions. For instance, in United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State
Water Conservation Commission,62 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that, prior to issuing future water permits for coal-fired power plants,
the state engineer would be required to complete long and short term
planning surveys, including weighing the potential effect of such permits
on water supply and future water needs. 63 This holding was based upon
the common law public trust doctrine, a state water policy statute pro-
viding that the public health, safety and welfare depends upon the pro-
tection and "wise utilization of all the water and related land resources,
and another statutory section declaring that "all waters 'belong to the
public' for the purpose of beneficial use." 64
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Robinson v. Ariyoshi,65 examined
Hawaii's historical use of water in light of recent constitutional provi-
sions in answering public trust questions certified by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. According to the Hawaii court, at the time private
58. 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65. The court also stated
that
[o]nce the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust imposes a duty of
continuing supervision over the taking and use of the appropriated water. In ex-
ercising its sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public interest, the
state is not confined by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light
of current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.
33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
59. 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
60. 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728-29, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
6 1. Dunning, The Mono Lake Decision. Protecting a Common Heritage Resourcefrom Death by
Diversion, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)10144 (1983); Note, National Audubon Soci-
ety v. Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617 (1984); Note,
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: A Watershed Case Integrating the Public Trust
Doctrine and California Water Law, 5 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 121 (1983); Note, The Shadow of the
Mono Lake Decision in Montana, 6 PuB. LAND L. REV. 203 (1985); Note, Reconciling the Public
Trust Doctrine and Appropriative Water Rights in California, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219 (1984);
Comment, Public Trust Doctrine Protects Navigable Waters From Harm Caused by Diversion of Non-
navigable Tributaries: National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, II PEPPERDINE L. REV.
289 (1983).
62. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
63. Id. at 461-62.
64. Id. at 459, 461 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-01-01, -26 (1960)).
65. 65 Hawaii 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982).
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ownership was introduced to the islands, the Hawaiian king reserved
ownership of all surface waters, holding them in trust for the public.
6 6
Further, the court noted that the public trust doctrine was codified in
1978 by a constitutional provision stating that "[a]ll public resources are
held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people."
'6 7
Public trust rights in recreational uses have also been recognized
and upheld. For instance, in Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Associa-
tion,6 8 the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the public trust doctrine
to permit the public use of non-public dry sand beach areas for bathing,
swimming, and other shore activities. 6 9 This holding was based, in part,
upon the court's conclusion that the the public's right to swim and bathe
below the high water mark might "depend upon a right to pass across
the upland [privately owned] beach." ' 70 Similarly, the recreational use
by the public of surface waters flowing over privately-owned streambeds
has been held to be a protected right under the public trust doctrine.
7 1
Citing the Montana Constitution, 7 2 the Montana Supreme Court has
twice held that "any surface waters that are capable of recreational use
may be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or
navigability for nonrecreational purposes."' 73 Furthermore, the court
stated that the issue of navigability was "immatcrial to determining the
question of navigability for recreational purposes under Montana state
law."
74
66. 658 P.2d at 310.
67. 658 P.2d at 311 n.34 (quoting HAWAII CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1978). Butsee Robinson
v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985) (where parties' water rights had previously been
determined by territorial court, a subsequent state judicial decision adopting common law
of riparian rights to the detriment of the parties' rights would require condemnation pro-
ceeding), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-406).
68. 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
69. 471 A.2d at 363.
70. Id. at 364.
71. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1093
(1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (1984).
72. MoNr. CONST. art. IX (1972).
73. Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1093; Curran, 682 P.2d at 171. But see Bott v. Comm'n of
Natural Resources, 415 Mich. 45, 327 N.W.2d 838, 846 (1982) ("The public trust doctrine
applies only to navigable waters and not to all waters of the state;" recreational boating is
not determinative of navigability) (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 171. For other recent cases upholding or recognizing the public trust doc-
trine with regard to water or water-related lands, see Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Pan-
handle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983) (public trust doctrine does
not prohibit private dock from being built in public lake); People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago
Park Dist., 66 Ill.2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976) (conveyance of submerged Lake Michigan
property by legislature violated public trust); James v. Inhabitants of Town of West Bath,
437 A.2d 863, 865 (Me. 1981) ("Maine's tidal lands and resources, including marine
worms, are held by the State in public trust for the people of the State."); Opinion of the
Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981) (standard of reasonableness is used in determining
whether legislature's dealings with public trust are valid); Opinion of the Justices, 383
Mass. 895, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (1981) (state's vestigial interest could be eradicated after
hearing); Superior Pub. Rights, Inc. v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 80 Mich. App. 72,
263 N.W.2d 290 (1977) (Department of Natural Resources not obligated to find that every
possible use of public trust land is in itself beneficial); State v. Forehand, 67 N.C. App.
148, 312 S.E.2d 247 (1984) (grant of submerged land for wharf purposes does not convey
title); Thomas v. Sanders, 65 Ohio App. 2d 5, 413 N.E.2d 1224 (1979) (land reclaimed
from Lake Erie is subject to public trust); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or.
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As the preceding historical review evidences, the public trust doc-
trine has undergone substantial development between its birthplace
along the Mediterranean and its modern applications in the American
West. The doctrine's pervasive presence in the governmental manage-
ment of water resources makes it imperative that means for integrating
the doctrine into modem legal systems of water allocation and manage-
ment be identified, investigated and debated. The following proposal to
convert public trust use requirements for water into a species of re-
served rights represents a considered effort to initiate this much-needed
process of resolution and integration.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE SHOULD BE VIEWED AS EFFECTING
AN IMPLIED RESERVATION OF WATER FOR PUBLIC TRUST USES
A. Preface
The use of analogies as aids in legal analysis is an exercise fraught
with peril. Often, they mislead because of the lack of precision with
which they are used and seldom do authors state the limits of their anal-
ogies. Yet, for all their pitfalls, analogies can promote the understand-
ing of obscure or complex concepts, especially when those concepts are
unfamiliar or previously unknown, by relating them to well-established
and well-understood concepts. Thus, despite the often questionable
usefulness of analogies in legal analysis, the analogy of public trust doc-
trine water rights in inland waters to federal reserved water rights in
such waters is offered as a means of reducing the destablizing effect that
the renaissance of the public trust doctrine has had on the security of
existing water rights7 5 and to explain why states are not constitutionally
required to compensate water rights holders who may be adversely af-
fected by the exercise of public trust rights.
76
197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979) (Director of Division of State Lands must weigh the public need
for filling in estuary against the public interest in navigation, fishing, and recreation). For
cases dealing with the public trust doctrine as it applies to non-water-related areas, see
State v. Zimring, 58 Hawaii 106, 566 P.2d 725 (1977); Wade v. Kramer, 121 Ill. App. 3d
377, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (1984); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n,
452 So.2d 1152 (La. 1984). See also Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n,
466 U.S. 198 (1984) (reversing California's assertion of public trust rights over certain
tidelands; in order for state public trust interests to be recognized in federal confirmation
(through special legislation) of Mexican land grant, state would have had to assert those
rights at the patent confirmation hearing).
75. See Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?. 30
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1, 17-25. (noting the tension between the public trust doc-
trine and appropriative water rights). Professor Dunning notes that "[aill existing water
rights which adversely impact public trust values are now subject to reconsideration and
modification by either an agency or a court in the name of the public trust." Id. at 17-42.
See also WESTERN WATER 3 (March/April 1983) (wherein the General Counsel of the Asso-
ciation of California Water Agencies is quoted as saying: "You wonder if any of the water
rights in the state are that secure any more.").
76. The literature on the public trust doctrine reflects a vigorous debate on the ques-
tion of whether compensation ought be paid to water right holders whose rights are in-
fringed by the state's exercise of the public trust doctrine. Compare Smith, The Public Trust
Doctrine and NationalAudubon Society v. Superior Court: A Hard Case Makes Bad Law or the Consis-
tent Evolution of California Water Rights, 6 GLENDALE L. REV. 201, 203 (1984) ("As applied by
the [Mono Lake] court the public trust doctrine does not frustrate expectations of appropri-
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B. The Public Trust Doctrine is an Integral Element of the Sovereign Powers
of a State
That the public trust doctrine is an incident of sovereignty is evi-
dent from its origins and evolution. 77 As such, it is always available to
the judiciary of a state as a basis for scrutinizing the effects of adminis-
trative and legislative decisions to use or allocate public trust resources.
Although the public trust doctrine has been characterized as merely a
variant of a state's police power,7 8 the two are only indirectly connected.
While the police power of the state is usually exercised by the state in an
affirmative manner to further the public health, safety, and welfare, 79
the public trust doctrine is essentially a constraint on state actions,80
even those state actions that arguably further the public health, safety,
and welfare.
While admittedly some affirmative action is necessary to invoke the
doctrine, 8 1 the doctrine is essentially a dormant sovereign power8 2 exer-
cised, as is the dormant commerce clause power,8 3 by the judicial arm of
the sovereign. Moreover, the public trust doctrine and the police power
may be distinguished by the public trust doctrine's dependence upon
the state's retention of an ownership interest in the resource.8 4 No such
dependence exists for the police power as it can regulate public as well
as wholly private resources in furtherance of the public interest.8 5 Thus,
ative water right holders because the power to use an appropriative right has always been
subject to the discretion of the State.") with Comment, The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on
the Public Trust Doctrine in Water Law, 15 PAc. L.J. 1291, 1319 (1984) ("The preexisting title
theory of the public trust doctrine asserts retroactively that the water rights holder never
possessed the property, therefore, compensation is not required when the state acts to
protect public trust uses that conflict with the water rights. This contravenes the mandate
of the fifth amendment." (footnote omitted)).
77. See supra notes 11-74 and accompanying text.
78. See Sax, supra note 30, at 484-85.
79. State ex rel. Carpenter v. City of St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 897, 2 S.W.2d 713, 722
(1928); Exparte Tindall, 102 Okla. 192, 229 P. 125, 130 (1924).
80. Sax, supra note 30, at 473, 474, 477; Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maines
Submerged Lands: Public Rights, State Obligation and the Role of the Courts, 37 MAINE L. REV. 105,
118 (1985). Although it may be objected that the public trust doctrine cannot be both an
incident of sovereignty and a restraint on the state, this objection can be disposed of by the
following clarification in terms: the sovereign in the American political system is the peo-
ple and the public trust doctrine is an incident of that sovereignty. Thus, the duly consti-
tuted representative of the people - the state - may be constrained in its exercise of the
powers that the sovereign has entrusted to it by the sovereign's resort to the public trust
doctrine. Therefore, when I speak of the state as sovereign I do so as shorthand for
describing the state's role as the people's vehicle for their sovereignty.
81. In the past, most public trust actions have been brought by private parties. Mono
Lake, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983); United Plainsmen Ass'n, 247
N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). However, public bodies occasionally have relied upon the doc-
trine as a basis for some action. See, e.g., Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (legislative
repeal of a grant of submerged lands upheld on the basis of the public trust doctrine).
82. Contra Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Envi-
ronmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 68 (1982) (noting that "[tihe public trust
[doctrine] . . . is an active common law principle which, without more, protects the public
interest in navigable waters.").
83. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTIUTrIONAL LAW 266-67 (2d ed. 1983).
84. See H. ALTHAUS, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS 85 (1978).
85. Id.
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the police power can be used to regulate the use of a public trust re-
source where the legislature has extinguished its sovereign ownership
interests in that resource and has terminated the application of the pub-
lic trust doctrine to that resource. Furthermore, where the state has re-
tained a sovereign ownership interest in a particular resource, a
conversion from a wholly private use to a wholly public use effected
through the exercise of the police power would constitute a taking
under the fifth amendment requiring the payment of just compensa-
tion.8 6 However, if the conversion was effected under the public trust
doctrine no taking would occur, except in those instances where the pri-
vate property interest predated statehood, because of the pre-existing
title of the state in the public trust resource.
8 7
The interrelationship between the public trust doctrine and the
state's sovereign ownership of a particular trust resource, such as inland
waters, is of central importance to the analogy that may be drawn be-
tween the reserved water rights of the federal government and the pub-
lic trust water rights of a state. Although it may be objected that federal
reserved water rights are inextricably linked to the federal government's
ownership of land as a proprietor,8 8 this objection is bottomed on a
false premise: that the federal government can divorce itself of its sover-
eignty and own land in a strictly proprietorial sense. This unsound
proposition has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Kleppe
v. New Mexico, 89 where the Court held that "Congress exercises the pow-
ers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain." 90
Having disposed of the purported sovereign/proprietary distinction
in government land ownership, it is thus clear that the true foundation
for federal reserved water rights is the sovereign ownership interest that
the United States holds to the waters reserved: an ownership interest
86. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
87. Title to state public trust ownership interests, which are a species of public prop-
erty rights, "springs from the ownership of land conferred on the State of California upon
admission to the United States." Dunning, Public Trust Easement, supra note 19, at 364.
Note, Environmental Law--Expanding the Definition of Public Trust Uses, 51 N.C.L. REV. 316,
324 (1972).
At least one state supreme court has held that a state is not constitutionally required
to provide compensation for the infringement of a private property right by the initiation
of a public trust use on the theory that the state had impliedly reserved the right to use the
property for public trust uses. Sage v. Mayor of New York, 154 N.Y. 61, 79-80, 47 N.E.
1096, 1101 (1897).
88. "The reserved water so withheld is the property of the United States, and the
government, exercising its proprietary powers and rights, can put it to use without compli-
ance with state law." F. TRELFASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAw-LEGAL
STUDY No. 5, at 114 (1972).
89. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
90. Id. at 540. The repudiation of the proposition was foreshadowed almost two de-
cades ago by a commentator who asserted "that all activities of the federal government in
the land ownership field are sovereign, and nothing else." Sewell, The Government as a
Proprietor of Land, 35 TENN. L. REV. 287, 288 (1968) (footnote omitted). This view was
echoed in a student note, in which it was argued that "the judicially created dichotomy
between governmental obligations and proprietary rights of the state as landlord or licen-
sor is based on a mistaken premise that government can divorce itself from its sovereign
responsibilities." Note, The Government as Proprietor- The Private Use of Public Property, 55 VA.
L. REV. 1079, 1101 (1969).
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good against all other public and private parties. This sovereign owner-
ship interest is also the basis of state public trust doctrine water rights;
however, a state's sovereign ownership interest is always subordinate to
the federal government's sovereign ownership interest. Although it may
be argued that federal reserved water rights differ from public trust doc-
trine water rights because the former are integrated into the prior ap-
propriation system by way of stream-wide adjudications that assign to
federal reserved rights a priority date and a quantity, 9 1 whereas public
trust doctrine water rights to date have not been similarly integrated
into state water allocation systems, 92 there is no good reason to believe
that public trust doctrine water rights could not be similarly treated.
Certainly a state could bring claims in a stream-wide adjudication for
that water necessary to protect and preserve public trust uses of the
stream at issue.93 If successful, such claims would probably result in
public trust uses having the benefit of a relatively senior right because
the claimed priority would reflect the date the public trust obligation
arose in the state, which would be the date of that state's admission into
the Union.
94
C. Public Trust Interests in State Waters Have Been Recognized in State
Constitutions and Water Codes
To describe the numerous written histories of the origins and devel-
opment of the public trust doctrine as varied and divergent is, perhaps,
an understatement. Because of the antiquity of the events, circum-
stances, and documents involved, it is hardly surprising that commenta-
tors on the public trust doctrine have widely divergent views on the
degree to which the modern public trust doctrine has a sound ground-
ing in ancient and medieval jurisprudence. Yet, while this academic
jousting can certainly promote caution in the use of historical analogies
relating to the public trust doctrine, there is evidence that the American
variant of the English common law public trust doctrine was accepted,
without trepidation over the exact origins or development of the doc-
trine, throughout the West as an indispensible and salutary legal princi-
ple. The fundamental premise of the doctrine-that water is a common
91. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
92. This lack of intergration was expressly noted by the California Supreme Court in
Mono Lake:
This case brings together for the first time two systems of legal thought: the ap-
propriative water rights system ... and the public trust doctrine .... Ever
since we first recognized that the public trust protects environmental and recrea-
tional values, the two systems of legal thought have been on a collision course.
Mono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 426, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (citations omitted).
93. But see supra note * (where it is suggested that such integration may be nearing).
It would be preferable in the first instance to have state reserved rights claims brought
by the state, rather than by private parties. The reasons supporting such a preference are
the promotion of state-wide water planning by the state water resources agency for public
trust uses and the desirability of having a single entity litigating for state reserved rights,
instead of a variety of private parties, each of which may have sharply disparate private
agendas.
94. Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and California Water Law: National Audubon Society
v. Department of Water and Power, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653, 661 (1982).
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resource belonging to the people-is evidenced in the constitutions of
four western states. 9 5 These reservations of a sovereign ownership in-
terest in the waters of the western states reflected a popularly felt need
for governmental safeguards against the socially undesirable conse-
quences that may have followed from the private monopolization of
water supplies.96 The judiciary of at least one western state has explic-
itly recognized that the incorporation of the public trust doctrine into
the fundamental law of a state creates an affirmative obligation on the
part of a state to safeguard public trust uses in the management, alloca-
tion, and development of public trust resources.
9 7
The importance of public trust uses in western water resources is
also evidenced by the numerous statutory provisions confirming state
ownership interests in water resources. Ten western states have statu-
tory provisions declaring their waters to be the property of the state, 98
the people of the state,9 9 or the public.10 0 The high courts of some of
these states have recognized the public trust doctrine as a necessary cor-
ollary to state ownership. 10 ' Thus, the general rule is that the public
trust doctrine is an inherent and fundamental element of the foundation
of western water law: the state ownership of water resources.
10 2
III. PRE-EXISTING STATE OWNERSHIP INTERESTS, FEDERAL RESERVED
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF No COMPENSATION FOR THE
INFRINGEMENT OF JUNIOR WATER RIGHTS
It is undisputed that the public trust doctrine, as an incident of sov-
95. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 ("The water of every natural stream ... is hereby
declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided."); MONT. CONST. art.
IX, § 3 ("All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries
of the state are the property of the state for the use of its people .... "); N.M. CONST. art.
XVI, § 2 ("The unappropriated water of every natural stream . . . is hereby declared to
belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation . . ."); Wvo. CONST. art. 8, § I
("The water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within
the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state.").
96. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF COLORADO 44
(1907), where a convention delegate proposed that "[i]t shall be the duty of the legislature
from time to time to pass such laws as may be necessary to secure a just and equitable
distribution of the water . . . [and thereby] promote the greatest good to the greatest
number of the citizens .... "
97. United Plainsmen Ass'n, 247 N.W.2d at 462. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1, 17-33 ("The
North Dakota court . . . treated state constitutional and statutory provisions on state and
public ownership of water as expressions of the trust.").
98. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-101 (1977); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.021 (Vernon
1972).
99. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-131(A) (Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-202
(1984); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.025 (1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-3 (1983); OR.
REV. STAT. § 537.110 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 90.03.010 (Bancroft-Whitney & West 1962).
101. See, e.g., State exrel. Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1950), appeal
dismissed, 341 U.S. 924 (1951); Motd v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926).
102. Contra Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638,
643-45 (arguing that the real basis of a state's control over its water resources is its police
power).
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ereignty, arises upon the formation of a sovereign government. It fol-
lows then that the doctrine becomes binding as of the date of a state's
admission into the Union. Concurrently, a state also obtains the com-
plete ownership of the inland waters within its boundaries, subject to
superior federal ownership interests, l0 3 private ownership interests ob-
tained directly or indirectly from the federal government, 10 4 and other
ownership interests withheld by the federal government pursuant to
treaties.' 0 5 It is from this posture of ownership that the western states
have allocated rights to use water resources to private parties.
That a water right is a usufructuary right is a fundamental legal
maxim in western water law. Since the genesis of the prior appropria-
tion doctrine, it has been universally recognized that the right to take
and use water from a natural stream "is subject to the paramount right
of the public to use or dedicate water for state purposes."' 1 6 The fun-
damental character of a water right as merely a usufructuary right, rather
than as a possessory right, is perhaps best highlighted by "the fact that
the states, in granting appropriative water rights, issue only 'permits' or
'licenses' rather than 'deeds' or other documents which evidence 'own-
ership' of property."'
10 7
Although some commentators have pointed to the fifth amend-
ment's prohibition against the taking of private property without the
payment ofjust compensation 10 8 as a potential "limitation on the public
trust doctrine,"' 0 9 these arguments are dependent on the acceptance of
103. This category would include federal and Indian reserved rights as well as potential
federal non-reserved rights.
104. This category would include ownership interests received by private parties di-
rectly from Congress or through the auspices of a territorial government, such as was the
case in Aroyoshi, 65 Hawaii 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982).
105. This category would include the lagoon tidelands involved in Summa, which were
not passed to California by the federal government upon its admission into the Union,
because under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the federal government did not acquire
any fee interest in those lands. The private owners of those lands, who had acquired them
from the Mexican Government, subsequently had their title confirmed through federal
patent proceedings. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288,
291, 644 P.2d 792, 794, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 601 (1982), rev'd sub noma. Summa Corp. v.
California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984). Due to the complete absence
of any state ownership interests in the lagoon tidelands and the acquisition of those lands
by their original private owners prior to California statehood, the Supreme Court was cor-
rect in holding that the public trust doctrine could not be imposed upon the lagoon tide-
lands in the complete absence of notice to the tideland owners of California's claim.
Summa, 466 U.S. at 209. See also infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (sufficient no-
tice given to appropriators of state waters of the public character of inland water
resources).
106. Walston, supra note 82, at 83.
107. Id.
108. U.S. CONST. amend V. The takings clause of the fifth amendment has been held to
be applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment. Chicago B. & Q R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
109. See, e.g., Comment, The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine in
Water Law, 15 PAc. L.J. 1291 (1984); R. Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Tak-
ing Clause: A Collision Course (February 13, 1986) (outline of presentation given to an
ABA Section of Natural Resources water law seminar held in San Diego on February 13-
14, 1986) (on file with the author).
In the Mono Lake litigation, Los Angeles, however, may be unable to claim that its
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the premise that recipients of water rights from the states had no notice
of the retention of sovereign ownership interests by the states and the
accompanying public trust obligations." 0 That such a premise is unten-
able is evident when one recalls that the usufructuary principle of west-
ern water law is a universally recognized "expression of the state's trust
.responsibilities to its citizens in the water rights context.""' 1 Moreover,
given the constitutional and statutory declarations of state or public
ownership of water resources upon which western water law was
founded,' 12 the "no notice" premise of the takings argument is, at best,
a strained appeal to equity for it also ignores the numerous judicial affir-
mations of the public nature of state inland water resources"13 and the
common understanding, prevalent throughout the West, that the inland
water resources of a state "belong" to all the people of the state." l 4
Thus, the acquisition of water rights by a state under the public trust
doctrine would, like federal reserved rights acquired by the federal gov-
ernment, not require the payment ofjust compensation for the infringe-
ment of privately-held water rights.
CONCLUSION
The proposition that a new species of public water rights ought to
be created at a time when state water law systems in the West are just
now painstakingly incorporating federal reserved rights into the fabric
of the present weave of ownership rights in water1 15 will undoubtedly
strike many water rights holders, water lawyers, and legal scholars as
undesirable, unwise, or worse. However, the public trust doctrine
seems destined to remain a formidable influence on water law in the
West because it serves the socially desirable function of permitting as-
sessments and reassessments of past, present, and future legislative and
administrative decisions affecting the management, allocation and devel-
opment of a state's water resources. 1 16 Thus, the security of existing
water rights, which already have been threatened by the potential de-
property has been unconstitutionally taken because the Supreme Court has held that mu-
nicipalities may not bring such claims against an unwilling state. Trenton v. New Jersey,
262 U.S. 182 (1923).
110. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 108, at 1306-07.
111. Walston, supra note 82, at 85. Walston also asserts that "[tihe usufructuary princi-
ple is both an outgrowth and an extension of the public trust doctrine." Id.
112. Supra notes 95, 98-100 and accompanying text.
113. Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
114. "[Wlater in the western states, and particularly in California, is owned by all the
people in the state." Remarks of Ron Robie, Director of the California Department of
Water Resources, in THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND MAN-
AGEMENT: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 132 (H. Dunning ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as CON-
FERENCE PROCEEDINGS]. It has also been argued that "[t]he usufructuary principle
provides a warning to holders of water rights that their rights are subject to modification as
necessary to achieve more important social goals." Walston, supra note 82, at 88.
115. See, e.g., United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
116. See Alono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 445-47, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65; see
also CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 114, at 134, where Ron Robie argues that "[w]e
need the flexibility [provided by the public trust doctrine] to change things we have done
wrong in the past."
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mand for water necessary to satisfy federal and Indian reserved
rights,1 7 will probably be further undermined. This uncertainty could,
however, be diminished if claims for the water necessary to preserve and
protect public trust uses were pressed by the states in stream-wide adju-
dications. 1 18 By quantifying the water requirements of public trust uses
in such a manner, water rights holders would gain important informa-
tion about the relative security of their water rights. Thus, they could
plan for and effect whatever measures, such as the acquisition of higher
priority rights or the augmentation of supply through water conserva-
tion, were necessary to make available enough water to satisfy the re-
quirements of public trust uses, while maintaining their current uses.
There is no doubt that such changes in water allocation will cause some
measure of hardship during this renaissance of public ownership inter-
ests in water resources. Yet, if a state reserved rights theory is chosen as
the means for incorporating society's requirements for water necessary
for public trust uses into the prevailing system of water allocation, the
security of existing water rights can be enhanced with a modicum of
time and expense by treating public trust doctrine water rights as a state
version of federal reserved water rights.1 19
While the doctrine of federal reserved water rights offers a model,
albeit a less than perfect one, for incorporating the water requirements
of public trust uses into existing water rights systems, it must be
remembered that state reserved rights for public trust uses should be
subject to reassessment and contraction or expansion in light of chang-
ing circumstances, such as changes in environmental conditions or soci-
ety's demand for a particular public trust use. This malleability, which
principally distinguishes the suggested state reserved water right from
its federal counterpart, derives from its basis in the American variant of
the common law public trust doctrine.120 That being the case, state re-
117. A recently issued report of the Western Governors' Association concludes that
Indian water rights in the West may be as high as forty-five million acre-feet a year, an
amount that is more than three times the Colorado River's annual flow. WESTERN GOVER-
NORS' ASSOCIATION, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 93 (1984).
118. The state's role in applying for public trust water rights in stream-wide adjudica-
tions would be analogous to the efforts of the federal government to obtain water rights
for federal reservations in such adjudication. A major distinguishing feature, however,
between the obligations of these two sovereigns is that while it seems probable that a state
could be ordered to adjudicate claims for public trust water rights, Mono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at
446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364; see Sax, supra note 30, at 482-89, it appears that
the federal government cannot be ordered to press potential claims to federal reserved
water rights, at least not on a public trust doctrine theory. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F.
Supp. 842, 866 (D. Colo. 1985). However, such a duty may exist under various environ-
mental protection statutes. See id. at 865.
Of course, in some instances such claims would already be present in the form of
agency applications for water necessary to comply with statutory and administrative direc-
tives on minimum instream flows, fish and wildlife enhancement and water-related recrea-
tional uses.
119. There undoubtedly would be litigation over precise character of public trust uses
and the amount of water sufficient to facilitate them. In this respect, the past and present
litigation over the same issues under the doctrine of federal reserved rights can be viewed
as having blazed a path and set out some meaningful guidelines.
120. Note, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented Extensions of the Public Trust, 70 CAL. L. REV.
1138, 1141 (1982) (noting that "[e]arly cases brought the public trust doctrine to this
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served rights should thus reflect the growth or diminution of the doc-
trine, which as a common law doctrine has as "its true glory, that it is
flexible, and constantly expanding with the exigencies of society."'21
Peter A. Fahmny*
country, but it has been adapted to American circumstances"); Note, The Public Trust Doc-
tine: , ,Vew Approach to Environmental Protection, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 455, 458 (1979) [herein-
after cited as Note, 4 New Approach! (noting that "Iwihile the American courts recognized
the basic premises of the trust concept, certain modifications were made to reflect the
social, economic and geographical conditions which existed at the time.").
121. THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS oFJosEPH STORY 526 (W. Story ed. Boston 1852);
Accord District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (not-
ing that the public trust doctrine contains "a dynamic common-law principle flexible
enough to meet diverse modern needs."); Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296,
309. 294 A.2d 47, 54 (1972) (holding that "Ithe public trust doctrine, like all common law
principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to
meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit."); Note,.4 New
Approach, supra note 120, at 459 (noting that "[als a common law theory, the public trust
doctrine has the inherent qualities of flexibilty and adaptability.").
** The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance ofJames R. Ghiselli
in researching and writing section 1 of this note.
1986]

